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Abstract— Recent experimental studies have shown that traf-
fic management systems are vulnerable to cyber-attacks on
sensor data. This paper studies the vulnerability of fixed-
time control of signalized intersections when sensors measuring
traffic flow information are compromised and perturbed by an
adversary. The problems are formulated by considering three
malicious objectives: 1) worst-case network accumulation, which
aims to destabilize the overall network as much as possible;
2) worst-case lane accumulation, which aims to cause worst-
case accumulation on some target lanes; and 3) risk-averse
target accumulation, which aims to reach a target accumulation
by making the minimum perturbation to sensor data. The
problems are solved using bilevel programming optimization
methods. Finally, a case study of a real network is used to
illustrate the results.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent experimental studies claim that about 200,000
vulnerable traffic control sensors are installed in important
cities around the world such as New York, San Francisco,
London, and Melbourne [3]. This indicates the presence
of cyber-threats to traffic management systems, since such
systems directly use the data measured by the vulnerable
sensors. In order to diminish these threats and design resilient
systems, the vulnerability of traffic control systems to cyber-
tampering of these sensors must be analyzed as an initial
step.
In the traffic management literature, queueing networks are
often used to model the movement of traffic [2], [12]. For
the traffic control purposes, various signal control policies
are defined based on the queue length information such as
max-pressure [14], [16], which is a feedback control policy,
and fixed-time control [11], which operates the signal in fixed
periodical cycles independent of the traffic state. Although
feedback control policies for signalized intersections have
advantages in terms of stabilizing the traffic flows, 90 percent
of all traffic signals in the US follow fixed-time control policy
[8].
Fixed-time control considers deterministic vehicle flows
subject to conservation constraints, constraints on saturation
flows, and simultaneous turn movements. The formulation
of fixed-time control policy leads to a characterization of
feasible demands and fixed-time control with minimum cycle
length to accommodate the feasible demands [13]. In this
direction, Muralidharan et al. showed that under fixed-time
control there is a unique periodic trajectory, which is globally
asymptotically stable, that is, every trajectory converges to
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this periodic trajectory [11]. From the periodic trajectory
one can easily calculate possible performance measures such
as delay, travel time, amount of service time wasted, and
progression quality.
Owing to the rising strategic risks of cyber-attacks, ex-
ploiting vulnerabilities of transportation systems to cyber-
attacks has been an active area of research. For instance,
recently Cerrudo has shown that wireless sensors can be
spoofed to manipulate traffic light timing [3]. Similarly, in
[5], Ghena et al. analyze the security of traffic infrastructure
in cooperation with a road agency located in Michigan.
The study reports three major weaknesses in the traffic
infrastructure: lack of encryption for the network, lack of
secure authentication, and vulnerability to known exploits.
Furthermore, Laszka et al. have recently proposed an ap-
proach for evaluating vulnerabilities of the transportation
network by identifying traffic signals with the greatest impact
on congestion [9]. They also present that the problem of
finding an optimal attack to maximize the congestion is
computationally hard, thereby, proposing a polynomial-time
heuristic algorithm for computing approximately optimal
attacks. Nevertheless, no vulnerability analysis of fixed-time
control policy has been done for transportation networks.
In this paper, we study the vulnerability of fixed-time
control when a malicious adversary compromises some sen-
sors and perturbs the data corresponding to the traffic flow
information. The attacker launches this integrity attack either
by directly compromising sensors or by gaining control over
the communication network. The tampered data can lead to
inefficient scheduling of traffic signals, and in some extreme
cases, it can lead to disastrous congestions. In this direction,
we formulate three attack problems: 1) Worst-case network
accumulation, which aims to destabilize the overall network
as much as possible; 2) Worst-case lane accumulation, which
aims to cause worst-case accumulation on some target lanes;
and 3) Risk-averse target accumulation, which aims to reach
a target accumulation by making the minimum perturbation.
We formulate these problems as bilevel programs, in which
one optimization problem is embedded within the other.
Bilevel programs are intrinsically hard to solve, and even
the simplest instance, the linear-linear case, is known to be
strongly NP-hard [7]. The existing algorithms for solving
bilevel programs include branch-and-bound, extreme point,
complementary pivot, descent methods, penalty function,
and trust-region [4]. We solve the problems using existing
implementations of branch-and-bound. Further, we present a
case study of vulnerability analysis of a real road network
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segment in the city of Nashville.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II defines the system model. In Section III, we
present the attacker model and formulate the problems. In
Section IV, we discuss how the problems can be solved.
Sevtion V presents the case study of vulnerability analysis
of a real road network. Finally, we conclude the paper in
Section VI with a discussion and future work.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Network Model
We use the network model presented in [13] with minor
modifications in notation. Consider a network of roads mod-
eled as a directed graph with road links being edges i ∈ Lall
and intersections being nodes n ∈ N . A link can be either
an internal link (i ∈ L) that goes from its start node to its
end node, an entry link (i ∈ Lent) that has no start node, or
an exit link i ∈ Lexit that has no end node.
A movement (i, j) describes an intention to travel from a
link i to a link j. Let the flow corresponding to movement
(i, j) be denoted by f(i, j). This means the rate of vehicles
intending to leave link i and enter link j per sample period is
f(i, j). Flow conservation imposes the following constraint
on all i ∈ L, ∑
h∈In(i)
f(h, i) =
∑
j∈Out(i)
f(i, j) (1)
where In(i) and Out(i) are the sets of upstream and
downstream links connected to i. This represents the same
concept as the formulation presented in [13], with routing
proportions being implicit in the formulation of each flow
f(i, j).
Intersections are modeled as nodes and traffic signals are
placed at every node to limit the set of permitted movements.
Defining a phase as a pair of links with j ∈ Out(i) and
i ∈ L ∪ Lent, saturation flow of phase (i, j) is denoted by
c(i, j). This means that if phase (i, j) is activated, up to
c(i, j) vehicles can move from i to j per sample period.
At an intersection n, certain subsets of phases may be
simultaneously activated, which is defined as a stage. Let
I(n) and O(n) denote the set of links entering and leaving in-
tersection n. As shown in Fig. 1, each stage is represented by
an intersection control matrix Sn = {Sn(i, j), i ∈ I(n), j ∈
O(n)} with entries Sn(i, j) = 1, if the phase (i, j) is
activated, or 0 otherwise. A collection of intersection control
matrices Sn, one for each intersection, can be combined into
the single network control matrix S, with S(i, j) = 1 if for
some intersection n, i ∈ I(n), j ∈ O(n), and Sn(i, j) = 1;
otherwise S(i, j) = 0. The matrix S can be put in block-
diagonal form with the intersection matrices Sn along the
diagonal and all other entries zero. The set of all network
control matrices S is denoted by S, which is a finite set of
0, 1 matrices.
B. Fixed-time Control
Fixed-time control is a collection of network control ma-
trices S1, ..., Sk, and corresponding durations λS1 , ..., λSk ,
Fig. 1: The eight phases of a standard intersection and the
control matrix S corresponding to the stage (NW, SE).
TABLE I: Flow data used in the example
From To Flow From To Flow
1
6 2
8
13 2
4 2 11 2
3
14 8
10
7 4
6 4 13 2
5
2 2
12
9 2
14 4 7 4
7
4 6
14
11 6
2 2 9 6
expressed in fractions of a cycle length T [13]. Let L be a
fixed lost time per cycle. The minimum cycle length T is
defined as T = L1−(∑λS)τ , where τ is the sample rate in
seconds. Suppose F = {f(i, j)} is a fixed flow matrix. The
following linear program (LP) solves the fixed-time control
problem
min
∑
S∈S
λS
s.t.
∑
S∈S
λSc(i, j)S(i, j) ≥ f(i, j), all (i, j)
λS ≥ 0, all ∀S ∈ S
(2)
Denote by λ∗ the minimum value of (2). Flow matrix F
is feasible if and only if λ∗ < 1 [13]. The fixed-time LP
(2) is easily solvable since it decomposes into small linear
programs, one per intersection.
C. Example
Figure 2 presents a network of 2 intersections with
16 phases. Suppose vehicles flow through the network
as the flow data shown in Table I. Consider four stages
(NS,SN), (WE,EW), (NE,SW), and (WN,ES) for each
intersection. More specifically, define the stages ϕ1 =
{(3, 14), (7, 4)}, ϕ2 = {(1, 6), (5, 2)}, ϕ3 = {(3, 6), (7, 2)},
and ϕ4 = {(1, 4), (5, 14)} for the first intersection, and
ϕ5 = {(14, 11), (10, 7)}, ϕ6 = {(12, 9), (8, 13)}, ϕ7 =
{(14, 9), (10, 13)}, and ϕ8 = {(12, 7), (8, 11)} for the sec-
ond intersection.
Fig. 2: An example of a network with 2 intersections
TABLE II: Fixed-time durations
Stage ϕ1 ϕ2 ϕ3 ϕ4 ϕ5 ϕ6 ϕ7 ϕ8
Duration .25 .062 .125 .125 .25 .083 .25 .166
Suppose the capacities for all the phases of the first and
second intersection are respectively, 32 and 24, and let λ =
(λϕ1 , λϕ2 , λϕ3 , λϕ4 , λϕ5 , λϕ6 , λϕ7 , λϕ8). Solving the LP (2)
for each intersection, the fixed-time durations are obtained
as shown in Table II. Consequently, for the first and second
intersections we obtain λ =
∑4
1 λϕi = 0.5625 and λ
′ =∑8
5 λϕi = 0.75, respectively. Assuming L = 1, if the same
cycle length is required for the entire network, it is computed
as T = 11−max(λ,λ′)τ = 4τ , where τ is the sample rate in
seconds.
III. ATTACKER MODEL
In this section, we provide a formulation for attacker
models that could result in congestion on road networks
implementing fixed-time control policy. We assume that the
attacker knows the network model, fixed-time algorithm,
implementation, and can thus compute the optimal schedule.
a) Action Space: The attacker compromises some of
the sensors measuring flows and perturbs their data. For-
mally, it selects a subset Q˜ of sensors and perturbs their flow
values to F˜ . Note that we assume the attacker cannot directly
change the schedule. But, this can be done indirectly through
perturbing the sensor data. This assumption is realistic since
it complies with the real-life cyber-attacks launched in the
previous experimental studies [3].
b) Objective: To define the attacker’s objective, we first
define the notion of a movement being unstable.
Definition 1: Unstable Movement: A movement (i, j) is
unstable if its service rate, i.e.,
∑
λSc(i, j)S(i, j)), is lower
than its flow rate f(i, j).
We assume the adversary’s objective is to make some
movements unstable, which in turn leads to the network
becoming unstable. More specifically, we consider the fol-
lowing different strategies for the adversary:
1) Worst-case network accumulation which aims to desta-
bilize the overall network as much as possible;
2) Worst-case lane accumulation which aims to cause
worst-case accumulation on some target lanes;
3) Risk-averse target accumulation which aims to reach a
target accumulation by making the minimum perturba-
tion.
c) Constraints: We assume the attacker is resource-
bounded, which means that there exists a budget B such
that the number of compromised sensors |Q˜| is less than
or equal to B, i.e., |Q˜| ≤ B. Further, we assume the sensor
data and the resulting schedules can only be changed to valid
values since otherwise the attack can easily be detected. This
means that first, the flow conservation (1) must be satisfied,
and second, the schedule obtained using perturbed data must
be feasible, i.e., λ∗ < 1. We formulate the attacker problems
assuming traffic signals are timed according to the optimal
fixed-time schedule.
A. Worst-Case Network Accumulation Attack
The attacker’s goal here is to destabilize the network as
much as possible and to cause the worst possible traffic
congestion. An attack A has two components of selecting
a subset of sensors Q˜ and choosing flow perturbation values
F˜ . The problem is formally defined below.
Problem 1: Worst-case Network Accumulation Attack:
Given a network of signalized intersections and a budget B,
find a worst-case attack A = (Q˜, F˜ ) such that it minimizes
the service rate of the entire network.
This problem can be formulated as the bilevel program
below.
max
Q˜,F˜
∑
ij
max(0, (fij −
∑
S
λ˜ScijSij))
s.t. λ˜S ∈ FT(F˜ )∑
λ˜S < 1∑
h
f˜(h, i) =
∑
j
f˜(i, j)
|Q˜| ≤ B
f˜(i, j) ≥ 0, all (i, j)
(3)
In the formulation above, the term fij −
∑
S λ˜ScijSij ,
describes the difference between the flow and the service
rate. The malicious attacker is only concerned with the
positive values for this difference, since negative difference
means extra service time, which indeed results in no accumu-
lation. Therefore, the max function is used in the objective
function to avoid the negative differences. The first constraint
represents the inner-level problem, where FT(F˜ ) corresponds
to the fixed-time LP (2) with flow matrix F˜ as its input. The
other constraints represent the feasibility of schedule, flow
conservation, and attacker’s budget respectively.
B. Worst-Case Lane Accumulation Attack
In a targeted attack, the attacker’s goal is to maximize
the accumulation rate of a particular lane, or similarly
to minimize its corresponding service rates, as much as
possible.
Problem 2: Worst-Case Lane Accumulation Attack: Given
a network of signalized intersections, budget B, and a target
lane la, find an attack A = (Q˜, F˜ ) that minimizes the service
rate of movements corresponding to the lane la.
This problem is formulated as
min
Q˜,F˜
∑
j
∑
S
λ˜Sc(l
a, j)S(la, j)
s.t. λ˜S ∈ FT(F˜ )∑
λ˜S < 1∑
h
f˜(h, i) =
∑
j
f˜(i, j)
|Q˜| ≤ B
f˜(i, j) ≥ 0, all (i, j)
(4)
The objective function is defined as the sum of the service
rates of all movements starting from la. By minimizing this
function, the target lane la will have a minimum service
time. Note that similar to the previous case, the attacker is
restricted by the feasibility of schedule, flow conservation,
and budget constraint.
C. Risk-Averse Target Accumulation Attack
A risk-averse attacker has the strategy of reaching a target
accumulation rate while minimizing the perturbations. That
is, the difference between the perturbed and actual flow
values (i.e., ‖F˜ − F‖) must be minimal.
Problem 3: Risk-Averse Target Accumulation Attack:
Given a network of signalized intersections, find an attack
A = (Q˜, F˜ ) that leads to an unstable service rate of {αij} for
some set of target movements Qa = {(i, j)}, via causing a
minimum perturbation ‖F˜ −F‖. This problem is formulated
as the optimization problem below.
min
Q˜,F˜
‖F˜ − F‖∞
s.t. λ˜S ∈ FT(F˜ )∑
S
λ˜Sc(i, j)S(i, j) ≤ αij ,∀(i, j) ∈ Qa∑
λ˜S < 1∑
h
f˜(h, i) =
∑
j
f˜(i, j)
|Q˜| ≤ B
f˜(i, j) ≥ 0, all (i, j)
(5)
Note that any other desired norm function can also be used
in the objective function.
IV. VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we present solution and evaluation methods
followed by an example.
A. Solution
The three problems described above are all strongly NP-
hard, but can be solved with the using of integer program-
ming and decomposition algorithms [4] [15]. Although the
computational results and finer details of these algorithms
have been suppressed here due to space limitations, we
discuss some preprocessing steps carried out in order to be
able to use known algorithms for solving bilevel programs.
1) Preprocessing: In order to handle the max function in
the objective function of the first problem, one can convert
the problem to a bilevel mixed-integer quadratic program
(BMIQP) as follows. In the objective function, for each term
of the form max(0, (fij −
∑
S λ˜ScijSij)), we introduce an
auxiliary binary variable yij ∈ {0, 1}, and add the constraint
fij −
∑
S λ˜ScijSij ≤Myij , where M is a sufficiently large
constant. Then, we replace the previous objective function
with:
max
F˜
∑
ij
(yijfij − yij
∑
S
λ˜ScijSij)
s.t. fij −
∑
S
λ˜ScijSij ≤Myij
(6)
In order to solve the risk-averse attacker problem, we rewrite
the objective function min ‖F˜ − F‖∞ as
min y
s.t. − y1 ≤ F˜ − F ≤ y1 (7)
where 1 is a vector of ones.
2) Solver: The problems are solved using methods for
solving bilevel mixed integer programs. Existing algorithms
in the literature include branch-and-bound, cutting planes,
etc. [4]. We use the optimization solver Gurobi to solve
the attacker problems [6]. We use the MATLAB toolbox
YALMIP to invoke Gurobi’s bilevel solver [10]. Also, note
that because of the worst-case nature of the first and second
problems, the optimal value of corrupted flow has to be as
small as possible, and thus, the solver can skip considering
different values of F˜ and only try extreme values.
B. Evaluation
1) Metrics: In order to quantify the vulnerability to worst-
case network accumulation attack, we define the network
vulnerability as follows:
Definition 2: Network Vulnerability: The vulnerability of
a network to cyber-tampering is
NV =
Accumulation Rate
Total Flow
(8)
In the definition above, accumulation rate is the to-
tal difference between traffic flow and service rate, i.e.,∑
ij max(0, (fij−
∑
S λ˜ScijSij)), and total flow is the sum
of all flow values, i.e.,
∑
ij f(i, j). The value of network
vulnerability represents the relative traffic congestion caused
by an attack. We also define lane vulnerability as follows:
Definition 3: Lane Vulnerability: The vulnerability of a
lane to cyber-tampering is
LV =
Lane Accumulation Rate
Lane Total Flow
(9)
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Fig. 3: (a) Network vulnerability as a function of attacker’s budget in the case of worst case network attack. (b) Lane
vulnerability as a function of attacker’s budget in the case of worst case lane attacks. (c) Risk-averse target attack. The
attacker’s goal is to reduce the service time fractions to 0.05 by making the minimum perturbation.
where similarly, lane accumulation is the difference between
flow and service rate of the lane, and lane flow is the sum
of its corresponding flow values.
2) Critical Sensor: Besides quantifying the vulnerability
of network and lanes, we define critical sensors, which have
the highest effect on congestion, as follows:
Definition 4: Critical Sensor: A sensor is critical with
respect to an attacker’s strategy, if it is included in the worst-
case attack.
Identifying the critical sensors allows us to locate the
most vulnerable elements of a network, which should be
strengthened first to increase the network’s resilience. For
instance, if there is a security budget that permits us to
replace only a subset of the sensors with more secure ones,
then we should start with replacing the critical sensors.
C. Example
We now study the attacker problems for the network of
Fig. 2. We first solve the worst-case accumulation rate prob-
lem (3). The results are shown in Fig. 3a as a function of the
attacker’s budget B. As the budget increases (i.e., the attacker
is able to compromise more sensors), the accumulation rate
increases as well. Also, the results indicate that by controlling
only 4 sensors, the attacker can decrease the total service
time by up to 35%.
The worst-case lane accumulation problem is solved sim-
ilarly. Fig. 3b shows the results for the lanes 3, 7, and 14 as
targets according to different budgets. Finally, for the case of
risk-averse target accumulation attacks, assume the attacker’s
objective is to find the minimum perturbation that leads to
the target service rate of 0.05, which is indeed unstable for
any stage. Fig. 3c shows the minimum perturbation for each
stage.
V. CASE STUDY
We analyze the vulnerability of a real road network
segment in the city of Nashville, TN. The area spans between
1st Ave, 8th Ave, Demonbreun St, and Charlotte Ave. The
network under consideration comprises 15 intersections (12
four-way and 3 three-way), and 104 movements. In order
to perform vulnerability analysis, we use real traffic history
TABLE III: Sensor measurements with the highest frequency
of being attacked.
Sensor measurement Frequency
Charlotte Ave-8th Ave (WE) 98%
Broadway-8th Ave (NW) 97%
Charlotte Ave-8th Ave (SE) 95%
Demonbreun St-8th Ave (NE) 95%
Charlotte Ave-5th Ave (WE) 94%
Charlotte Ave-3rd Ave (NE) 94%
Broadway-8th Ave (WE) 91%
Broadway-5th Ave (WE) 83%
data provided by Tennessee Department Of Transportation
(TDOT) [1]. For lanes with no available data, we estimate
their demands using data from their adjacent lanes. Also,
since our dataset only provides demands for unidirectional
movements, we estimate bidirectional demands considering
flow conservation constraints. We assume that fixed-time
schedule is computed based on hourly demand, with the total
demand being approximately 15000 vehicles per hour.
Figure 4a presents the results for the worst-case network
accumulation problem. The results indicate that by compro-
mising roughly 21 sensors, which is 20% of the total sensors,
the attacker can cause an accumulation of up to 4000 vehicles
per hour. Table III shows the sensors that appeared most
frequently in the worst-case attacks scenarios.
Next, we solve the worst-case lane attack problem for
some target lanes. The results are shown in Fig. 4b for some
different budgets. The data shows that on average, it is easier
to cause a disastrous congestions on Broadway-2nd Ave than
the other two lanes.
Finally, we solve the risk-averse target attack problem. As
the target, we assume the attacker has the goal of reducing
the service rate of an intersection by at least 50%. The
results are shown in Fig. 4c for all 15 intersections. The
second and thirteenth intersections (i.e., Charlotte Ave-5th
Ave and Demonbreun St-3rd Ave) need the highest and
lowest perturbations respectively.
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Fig. 4: (a) Network vulnerability as a function of attacker’s budget in the case of worst-case network attack. (b) Lane
vulnerability as a function of attacker’s budget in the case of worst-case lane attacks. (c) Minimum perturbation needed to
reduce the service time of each intersection by at least 50%, in the case of risk-averse target accumulation attack.
Fig. 5: Traffic heatmap of case study after one hour has
passed from a worst-case network accumulation attack.
Green represents normal traffic and red represents congested
traffic.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We studied the vulnerability of fixed-time control of sig-
nalized intersections when sensors measuring traffic flow in-
formation are perturbed by an adversary. As the threat model,
we considered an attacker that has the objective of congesting
the road network. We formulated three attacker problem
and solved them using bilevel programming optimization
methods. We found that fixed-time control is vulnerable to
cyber-attacks and by compromising only a small number of
sensors, an attacker can create severe network congestion.
Our approach also identified critical sensors, which have the
highest impact on congestion. We illustrated our approach
by analyzing the vulnerability of a real road network.
This paper forms the initial step towards more resilient
traffic control systems. We aim to extend our results in two
directions: first, to design a resilient fixed-time control of
signalized intersections so that even if some of the sensors
are tampered with, a relatively congestion-free traffic flow
is still ensured; and second, to perform the vulnerability
analysis of feedback control policies to cyber-tampering.
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